Accession and the End of Non-Alignment¶
Sweden acceded to NATO on 7 March 2024, completing a strategic reorientation that 200 years of neutrality made almost unthinkable before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Together with finland’s accession in April 2023, Sweden’s membership closed the Baltic Sea access question for the alliance: the Baltic is now bordered by Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, poland, Germany, and Denmark — all NATO members — with Russia maintaining only the Leningrad Military District coastline and the Kaliningrad exclave as its Baltic access points.
The political journey to accession was complicated by Turkey’s 14-month hold on Sweden’s membership bid, requiring extensive bilateral negotiations before Ankara withdrew its objection in July 2023. Hungary added a further delay before ratifying in February 2024. The result — Sweden as the 32nd NATO member — was nonetheless faster than most analysts had projected in the months following the 2022 invasion.
Two Centuries of Neutrality: The Defence Consequences¶
Sweden’s long neutrality was not pacifist — at its Cold War peak in the 1960s, Sweden operated one of the largest air forces in Europe and maintained a conscript army of 800,000. The post-Cold War drawdown, however, was severe. Between 1990 and 2014, Sweden eliminated most of its reserve structure, closed bases, sold equipment, and reduced defence spending to approximately 1.1% of GDP. Conscription was suspended in 2010, replaced by a purely professional volunteer force that proved incapable of generating the manpower required for credible territorial defence.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 began reversing this trend. Conscription was reintroduced in 2018 — covering both men and women, the first gender-neutral military draft in Europe — and the annual intake has grown from an initial 4,000 to approximately 8,000 per year by 2024, with further expansion planned. The defence budget has grown from 1.1% of GDP in 2014 to 2.4% in 2024, a trajectory that parallels finland’s and the Baltic states’ post-2022 acceleration.
SAAB and the Swedish Defence Industry¶
Gripen: Sweden’s Strategic Asset¶
Sweden’s most important defence export, and the centrepiece of Swedish air power, is the SAAB JAS-39 Gripen — a delta-canard fourth-generation fighter developed domestically and first flown in 1988. The Swedish Air Force currently operates approximately 60 JAS-39E/F Gripen (the E-series being the current production standard, with the F designating the two-seat training variant), with deliveries of the E-series replacing older C/D aircraft completing through 2027.
The Gripen E offers genuinely competitive fourth-generation capability: an AESA radar (PS-05/A Mk 4), advanced EW suite (BOY 92), high-off-boresector missile engagement with the IRIS-T and Meteor BVR missiles, and an air-to-ground capability including the KEPD 350 Taurus cruise missile integration. Its primary advantages are operational cost (significantly cheaper per flight hour than F-35 or Typhoon), short-field operations (can operate from highway strips), and SAAB’s sophisticated EW packages. Against peer-adversary air defences, the Gripen lacks low-observable characteristics — a gap that Sweden plans to address through a future fighter programme, with initial studies suggesting a potential F-35 acquisition in the 2030s.
| Platform | Quantity | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| JAS-39E/F Gripen | ~60 | Air superiority, strike, recon | In service, deliveries ongoing |
| JAS-39C/D Gripen | ~30 | Transition/training (retiring) | Being replaced by E-series |
| ASC 890 SAAB | 2 | Airborne early warning | In service |
| Tp 84 Hercules | 8 | Strategic airlift | In service |
SAAB Beyond Gripen¶
SAAB is a full-spectrum defence company, not merely an aircraft manufacturer. Its product range relevant to Swedish and export military capability includes:
- GlobalEye AEW&C: Large-area surveillance aircraft based on Bombardier Global 6000, sold to UAE and Sweden. Provides NATO-standard airborne early warning coverage across the Baltic Sea and beyond.
- RBS-70 NG MANPADS: A laser-guided surface-to-air missile system, one of the most capable SHORAD platforms in service globally, with a range of 9 kilometres and a 5-kilometre altitude ceiling. Operated by Sweden and exported to 20+ countries.
- AT4 and Carl Gustaf: The AT4 rocket launcher and Carl Gustaf 84mm recoilless rifle are among the world’s most widely used anti-armour weapons, with combined production exceeding 1 million units and operators in 50+ countries. Revenue from these small arms exports is substantial and provides a stable funding base for SAAB’s R&D.
- Archer SPH: The FH77BW Archer is a fully automated 155mm self-propelled howitzer mounted on a Volvo 8×8 chassis. Archer can engage a target within 30 seconds of stopping and drive away in under 30 seconds after firing — critical for avoiding counter-battery fire. Sweden operates approximately 48 Archer systems, and Norway has also fielded them.
SAAB’s global revenue in 2024 was approximately SEK 65 billion (~€5.8 billion), making it one of the top 20 defence companies globally and the dominant European-owned defence manufacturer for airborne systems below the largest aircraft.
Gotland: The Baltic’s Hinge Point¶
Strategic Significance¶
Gotland, Sweden’s largest island at 3,183 square kilometres, sits at the geographic centre of the Baltic Sea — equidistant between Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Russian Kaliningrad exclave. Whoever controls Gotland controls the air and sea approaches to the Baltic’s eastern half. During the Cold War, Swedish and Soviet planners both assessed Gotland as the key terrain for Baltic control: surface-to-air missile systems or anti-ship missiles placed on Gotland can threaten or deny access to aircraft and ships across the entire eastern Baltic.
Russia’s military planners have repeatedly demonstrated awareness of Gotland’s significance. Swedish military exercises in 2016–2017 identified that Russian airborne or amphibious forces could potentially seize Gotland faster than Sweden could reinforce it — a finding that shocked Swedish political and military leadership and accelerated the decision to permanently restation troops on the island.
By 2024, Sweden had repositioned the Gotland Regiment (P 18) — a combined-arms battlegroup with Leopard 2 tanks, CV90 IFVs, Archer howitzers, and RBS-70 NG air defence — to a permanent garrison on the island. Additional pre-positioned air defence missiles and coastal defence artillery (RBS-17 Hellfire coastal variant) give Gotland’s defenders the capability to engage both aerial and surface threats. The island is now a significant A2/AD node within NATO’s Baltic Sea posture, making any Russian attempt to seize it a high-cost combined-arms operation rather than an opportunistic airborne raid.
The A26 Submarine Programme¶
Capability and Timeline¶
Sweden’s submarine force is among the most capable in any European navy operating in shallow, confined waters. The existing fleet — three Gotland-class and one Södermanland-class boats — has demonstrated exceptional performance in exercises, including the famous 2005 incident in which a Gotland-class submarine “sank” the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group during a joint exercise, penetrating the carrier’s escort screen repeatedly.
The A26 Blekinge-class submarine programme will deliver four boats to replace the Gotland and Södermanland classes. The first boat, HMS Blekinge, was launched in February 2024, with delivery expected in 2025. The second boat, HMS Skåne, is in advanced construction, with delivery projected for 2027. Two further hulls are under contract. The A26 is designed specifically for the Baltic Sea environment — shallow (average depth 55 metres), confined, and acoustically complex — with a focus on mine-laying, special operations support, and anti-submarine warfare in addition to anti-ship and anti-surface missions.
The A26 adds a significant underwater denial capability to NATO’s Baltic Sea posture that is qualitatively different from anything available in the surface fleet. A Swedish submarine operating in the Baltic can hold Russian Baltic Fleet surface ships at risk, lay mines in approach channels, and gather intelligence on Russian naval movements — functions that complement Finland’s coastal mine defence and estonia’s coastal surveillance.
Army: Conscription Revival and Ground Capability¶
Conscription and Reserve Rebuilding¶
Sweden’s reintroduction of conscription in 2018 was the first politically contentious reversal of post-Cold War defence drawdown by any Nordic country. The annual intake of 8,000 conscripts (growing toward 10,000 by 2027) is creating a trained reserve that the 2010–2018 professional model entirely failed to generate. By 2030, Sweden projects a trained reserve of approximately 90,000 personnel — small compared to finland’s 900,000, but a fundamental change from the essentially zero trained reserve of the mid-2010s.
The current Swedish Army order of battle centres on four brigades: Northern Brigade (Boden), Gotland Regiment (P 18), Skaraborg Regiment (K 3 armoured), and the Guard and Life Regiment (Livgardet). Equipment includes approximately 120 Leopard 2A5 and 2A6S tanks — a capable fleet by European standards — and approximately 340 CV90 IFVs across multiple variants. The CV90 is manufactured in Sweden by BAE Systems Hägglunds and represents one of the best tracked IFVs in NATO service, with continuous upgrades maintaining its relevance through the latest CV90 Mk IV configuration.
Bilateral Agreements and Alliance Integration¶
US Defence Cooperation Agreement¶
The US-Sweden Defence Cooperation Agreement, signed in December 2023 and ratified in 2024, grants US forces access to 17 Swedish military installations across the country, including Malmen Air Base, Karlsborg, and the Gotland garrison. The agreement enables pre-positioning of US equipment and allows American forces to conduct sustained operations from Swedish territory — a capability the US previously relied on more distant bases in Germany and Norway to provide for Baltic scenarios.
Swedish-Finnish Integration¶
Swedish-Finnish military cooperation has been formalised through joint exercises, shared basing arrangements, and coordinated procurement. The two countries’ combined air forces — 60 Swedish Gripen E/F and 64 Finnish F-35A, with Sweden evaluating F-35 acquisition from the 2030s — represent a Northern European air umbrella with complementary capabilities: Finland’s F-35s providing stealth and fifth-generation sensor fusion, Swedish Gripens providing cost-effective volume and EW sophistication. Joint exercises under the Nordic Air Meet and bilateral frameworks have significantly improved tactical interoperability.
What Sweden Adds to NATO¶
Sweden’s primary contribution to alliance posture concentrates in four areas:
- Baltic Sea control: Gripen-equipped air forces capable of sea control missions, A26 submarines with anti-ship and mining capability, and Gotland as an unsinkable aircraft carrier at the Baltic’s centre.
- SAAB industrial capacity: The alliance’s premier European combat aircraft producer, a major supplier of MANPADS, anti-armour weapons, and airborne surveillance systems — with a proven export supply chain.
- Geographic closure: Sweden’s accession completes the alliance’s encirclement of the Baltic Sea, reducing Russian naval freedom of manoeuvre to two narrow access points (the Danish straits and the Finnish Gulf/Leningrad coast).
- Northern depth: Swedish territory provides strategic depth for finland’s western flank and a logistics corridor for reinforcement of Norway and the High North.
Sweden’s century of neutrality produced a unique strategic characteristic: its military capability developed on the assumption of fighting alone, without allies. The resulting force — independent logistics, organic air power, a navy designed to operate in contested waters without allied escort — is more self-sufficient than almost any equivalent-size NATO member, and thus adds genuine capability rather than merely adding to the alliance’s political headcount.